Sun Microsystems lodged a complaint with the European Commission relating to Microsoft Corporation's refusal to give Sun the information and technology necessary to allow its work group server operating systems to interoperate effectively with the Windows client PC operating system. Thereafter, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, launched an investigation relating to (1) Microsoft's Windows 2000 generation of client PC and work group server operating systems and (2) the integration by Microsoft of its Windows Media Player in its Windows client PC operating system. The Commission subsequently found that Microsoft (1) had dominant positions in the markets for client PC operating systems and work group server operating systems and (2) had abused its dominant positions in violation of Article 82 EC and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA).
On December 10, 1998, Sun Microsystems lodged a complaint with the European Commission relating to Microsoft Corporation's refusal to give Sun the information and technology necessary to allow its work group server operating systems to interoperate effectively with the Windows client PC operating system. Thereafter, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, launched an investigation relating to (1) Microsoft's Windows 2000 generation of client PC and work group server operating systems and (2) the integration by Microsoft of its Windows Media Player in its Windows client PC operating system. The Commission subsequently found that Microsoft (1) had dominant positions in the markets for client PC operating systems and work group server operating systems and (2) had abused its dominant positions in violation of Article 82 EC and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA).
The first abusive conduct in which Microsoft was found to have engaged consisted of its refusal to supply its competitors with "interoperability information" and to authorize the use of that information for the purpose of developing and distributing products competing with Microsoft's own products on the work group server operating systems market. The Commission defined "interoperability information" as the "complete and accurate specifications for all the protocols [implemented] in Windows work group server operating systems and . . . used by Windows work group servers to deliver file and print services and group and user administrative services, including the Windows domain controller services, Active Directory services and 'group Policy' services to Windows work group networks." The second abusive conduct in which Microsoft was found to have engaged consisted of Microsoft's making the availability of the Windows client PC operating system conditional on the simultaneous acquisition of the Windows Media Player software.
In 2004, the Commission imposed the following remedies:
1. Microsoft was ordered to make the interoperability information available to any company having an interest in developing and distributing work group server operating system products on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
Microsoft appealed that finding to the European Court of First Instance, which upheld the Commission's findings, its imposition of the fine, and its order that Microsoft (1) provide competitors with the software code necessary for them to achieve complete interoperability with the Windows PC operating system and (2) offer a version of Windows without the Microsoft Media Player. The Court also ordered Microsoft to pay certain costs associated with the case. Experts estimated that total fines, penalties, and cost could reach EUR 2 billion ($2.77 billion).
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On October 22, 2007, Microsoft issued the following press release:
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At the time the Court of First Instance issued its judgment in September, Microsoft committed to taking any further steps necessary to achieve full compliance with the Commission's decision. We have undertaken a constructive discussion with the Commission and have now agreed on those additional steps. We will not appeal the CFI's decision to the European Court of Justice and will continue to work closely with the Commission and the industry to ensure a flourishing and competitive environment for information technology in Europe and around the world.
Definition of the Relevant Product Markets and the Finding of Dominant Position
The Commission first identified three separate product markets: client PC operating systems, work group server operating systems, and streaming media players. It then determined that Microsoft had a dominant position in the first two. The Court concluded that the Commission was not manifestly incorrect in its definition of the three markets or in its finding that Microsoft had a dominant position in the first two markets. Moreover, the Court concluded that even if Microsoft did not have a dominant position in the work group server operating systems market, its use, by leveraging, of its quasi-monopoly on the client PC operating systems market to influence the work group server operating systems market would in and of itself have sufficed to support a finding that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in the client PC operating systems market.
Client PC Operating System Market
As regards the client PC operating systems market, the Commission cited the following factors to support its conclusion that Microsoft had a dominant position:
• Microsoft's market shares are over 90%.
• Microsoft's market power has enjoyed an enduring stability and continuity.
• There are significant barriers to market entry, owing to indirect network effects. Those network effects derive, first, from the fact that users like platforms on which they can use a large number of applications and, second, from the fact that software designers write applications for the client PC operating systems that are the most popular among users.
The Court agreed that Windows was not only a dominant product on the market for client PC operating systems but was, in addition, the de facto standard for those systems.
Work Group Server Operating Systems Market
The Court upheld the Commission's definition of the work group server operating systems market as the market for systems designed and marketed to deliver collectively file and print sharing services and group and user services to a relatively small number of client PCs linked together in a small or medium-sized network. The Commission cited the following factors in support of its finding that Microsoft had a dominant position in this market:
• Microsoft's market share is, at a conservative estimate, at least 60%.
• The position of Microsoft's three main competitors on that market is as follows: Novell, with its NetWare software, has 10 to 25%; vendors of Linux products have a market share of 5 to 15%; and vendors of UNIX products have a market share of 5 to 15%.
• The work group server operating systems market is characterized by the existence of significant entry barriers, owing in particular to network effects and to Microsoft's refusal to disclose interoperability information.
• There are close commercial and technological links between the work group sever operating systems market and the client PC operating systems market.
In arriving at its definition of the product market, the Commission took into account the demand-side substitutability and the supply-side substitutability of the products. As the Court pointed out, "A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use." Supply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when defining markets in those situations in which its effects are equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy.
The Court made it clear that the definition of the server market was not based on the idea that there is a separate category of server operating systems exclusively implementing file and print services and user and group administration services. The Commission expressly acknowledged that work group server operating systems may also be used to carry out other tasks, including running non-mission critical applications, such as internal email services.
The Refusal to License and to Authorize the Use of Interoperability Information
On appeal, Microsoft argued that its refusal to supply interoperability information could not constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC because, first, the information is protected by intellectual property rights (or constitutes trade secrets) and, second, the criteria established in the case law to determine when a firm in a dominant position can be required to grant a license to a third party were not satisfied in this case. Microsoft also claimed that the Commission did not properly take account of the obligations imposed on the Communities by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Annex 1 C to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization). The Court rejected each of these arguments.
The Court observed that, although firms are, as a rule, free to choose their business partners, in certain circumstances a refusal to supply on the part of a dominant firm may constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC unless it is objectively justified. Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Existence of Intellectual Property Rights Did Not Preclude Order to Share Interoperability Specifications
Microsoft claimed that the fact that its communication protocols were protected by intellectual property rights, including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, precluded a finding of abuse of dominant position. Although the parties devoted lengthy argument to this issue, the Court concluded that there was no need to ascertain the scope of Microsoft's intellectual property rights in order to resolve this case:
The arguments which Microsoft derives from the alleged intellectual property rights cannot, as such, affect the lawfulness of the contested decision. The Commission did not take a position on the merits of those arguments but adopted the decision on the assumption that Microsoft was able to rely on such rights in the present case. In other words, it proceeded on the premise that, so far as it relates to the interoperability information, the conduct at issue in the present case might not be a mere refusal to supply a product or a service indispensable to the exercise of a specific activity but a refusal to license intellectual property rights, and thus chose the strictest legal test and therefore the one most favorable to Microsoft.
In short, the Court concluded that the conditions for finding an abuse and for imposing the remedy were satisfied whether or not the information was protected by any patent, copyright, or trade secret.
Criteria for Determining Whether Refusal to License Is Abusive
The Court concluded that the Commission had demonstrated the three circumstances necessary for a finding that the refusal by a company in a dominant position to grant third parties a license covering intellectual property rights is abusive:
1. The refusal relates to a product or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a neighboring market;
2. The refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any effective competition on that neighboring market; and 3. The refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand.
In so ruling, the Court relied on decisions by the European Court of Justice in Volvo, Magill, and IMS Health. In Volvo, Case 238/87 [1988] ECR 6211, the European Court of Justice was asked whether the refusal by a car manufacturer which was the proprietor of a design right covering car body panels to license third parties to supply products incorporating the protected design must be considered to be an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC. In its judgment, the Court of Justice emphasized that the right of a proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without his consent, products incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right. The Court of Justice concluded that "an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty, a license for the supply of products incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of his exclusive right, and that a refusal to grant such a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position." The Court of Justice added, however, that the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor of a registered design might be prohibited by Article 82 if it involved certain abusive conduct, "such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a particular model even though many cars of that model [were] still in circulation..."
Another case, Magill, 5 concerned a decision in which the Commission had found that three television companies had abused their dominant position on the market represented by their respective weekly program listings and the market for the television guides in which those listings were published by relying on their copyright in those listings to prevent third parties from publishing complete weekly guides to the programs broadcast by the various different television channels. The Commission had ordered those television companies to supply their advance weekly program listings to each other and to supply them to third parties on request and on a non-discriminatory basis and to permit reproduction of those listings by those third parties. The Commission had also stipulated that any royalties requested by the television companies should they choose to grant reproduction licenses should be reasonable.
In Magill, the Court of Justice deemed the following circumstances relevant for evaluating whether the conduct of the television companies was abusive. First, their refusal concerned a product (the television channels' weekly program listings) the supply of which was indispensable to the exercise of the activity in question (the publication of a complete weekly television guide). Second, the refusal prevented the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programs, which the television companies in question did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand, which constituted an abuse under Article 82(b) EC. Third, the refusal was not justified. Finally, the television companies had reserved to themselves a secondary market, the market for weekly television guides, by excluding all competition on that market.
In IMS Health, 6 the Court of Justice ruled that a refusal by a dominant firm to grant a license to use a product protected by an intellectual property right constituted abusive conduct only "in exceptional circumstances." In particular, three cumulative conditions must be met: (1) the refusal must prevent the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, (2) the refusal must be unjustified, and (3) the refusal must exclude any competition in a secondary market.
The indispensable nature of the interoperability information
The Commission adopted a two-stage approach to determine whether the interoperability information was indispensable. First, it considered what degree of interoperability Microsoft's competitors needed to remain viably on the market. Second, it considered whether the information that Microsoft refused to disclose was indispensable to the attainment of that degree of interoperability.
The Commission recognized that some interoperability between PCs running Windows and work group server operating systems was already possible. Nonetheless, it concluded that the degree of interoperability that competitors could achieve using the available methods was too low to enable them to remain viably on the market.
The Court ruled that this was the correct approach to applying Article 82 EC, explaining:
Article 82 EC deals with the conduct of one or more economic operators involving the abuse of a position of economic strength which enables the operator concerned to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers. Furthermore, whilst the finding of a dominant position does not in itself imply any criticism of the undertaking concerned, that undertaking has a special responsibility, irrespective of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.
The Commission had concluded that, in order to be able to compete viably with Windows work group server operating systems, competitors' operating systems had to be able to interoperate with the Windows domain architecture on an equal footing with those Windows systems. The Court reasoned that the absence of such interoperability had the effect of reinforcing Microsoft's competitive position on the work group server operating systems market. In particular, it induced consumers to use its work group server operating system in preference to its competitors even though its competitors' operating systems offered features to which consumers attached great importance.
The Court noted that the Commission's order was not designed to enable non-Microsoft server operating systems to "clone" the features of Microsoft's products or to function in all respects like a Windows server operating system. The remedy extended only to interface specifications and not to the source code.
Elimination of Competition
The Commission next considered whether Microsoft's refusal to grant a license gave rise to a risk of eliminating competition on the work group server operating systems market. Microsoft contended that the Commission was required to demonstrate that its refusal to license was likely to eliminate all competition. The Court disagreed and held that it was sufficient for the Commission to find a risk that competition in the work group server operating systems market would be eliminated.
The Court characterized Microsoft's argument as "purely one of terminology." It explained that the expressions "risk of elimination of competition" and "likely to eliminate competition" are used without distinction by the Community judicature to reflect the same idea, namely, that Article 82 EC does not apply only from the time when there is no more, or practically no more, competition on the market.
The Court noted that Microsoft's market share, by units shipped, on the market for operating systems for servers costing under $25 000 grew from 25.4% in 1996 to 64.9% in 2002, a leap of almost 40% in just six years. If the Commission were required to wait until all competitors were eliminated from the market, or until their elimination was sufficiently imminent, before being able to take action under Article 82 EC, that would clearly run counter to the objective of that provision, which is to maintain undistorted competition in the common market and, in particular, to safeguard the competition that still exists on the relevant market.
The Commission had all the more reason to apply Article 82 EC before the elimination of competition on the work group server operating systems market had become a reality because that market is characterized by significant network effects, making elimination of competition difficult to reverse.
Nor was it necessary to demonstrate that all competition on the market would be eliminated. What matters, for the purpose of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, is that the refusal at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate all effective competition on the market. The fact that the competitors of the dominant firm retain a marginal presence in certain niches on the market is not sufficient to substantiate the existence of such competition.
Preventing Appearance of New Product
Microsoft maintained that its refusal had not prevented the appearance of a new product for which there is unsatisfied consumer demand. The Court rejected this claim, as well.
A "new product" is a product that does not limit itself to duplicating the products already offered on the market. It includes the development of advanced features of competitors' own products. The Court concluded that once Microsoft's competitors had the information needed for interoperability with the Windows domain architecture, they would be able to offer work group server operating systems which, far from merely reproducing the Windows systems already on the market, would be distinguished from those systems with respect to parameters that consumers consider important.
The Court observed that it is settled case law that Article 82 EC covers not only practices that may prejudice consumers directly but also those that indirectly prejudice them by impairing an effective competitive structure. In this case, Microsoft impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server operating systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that market. Accordingly, the Commission's finding that Microsoft's refusal limited technical development to the prejudice of consumers within the meaning of Article 82(b) EC was not manifestly incorrect.
Lack of Objective Justification
The burden was on Microsoft to prove that its abusive conduct was objectively justified. More particularly, it was required to show that disclosing the interoperability information would have a negative impact on its incentives to innovate. The Court concluded that the only arguments that Microsoft put forward on this issue were purely theoretical and wholly unsubstantiated.
The Court observed that it was normal practice for operators in the industry to disclose information that will facilitate interoperability with their products. Such disclosure allows operators to make their own products more attractive and therefore more valuable. Microsoft itself had followed that practice until it was sufficiently established on the work group server operating systems market.
Failure to Comply with TRIPS Agreement
The Court rejected Microsoft's argument that the Commission did not take proper account of the obligations imposed on the Communities by the TRIPS Agreement, stating that settled case law made it clear that the Community courts were not required to take the WTO agreements into account when reviewing the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions.
The Bundling of Windows Media Player with the Windows Client PC Operating System
The European Court of First Instance upheld the Commission's determination that Microsoft's failure to offer a version of the Windows client PC operating system without the Windows Media Player satisfied the conditions for a finding of a tying abuse for the purposes of Article 82 EC, namely, (1) Microsoft has a dominant position on the client PC operating systems market; (2) streaming media players and client PC operating systems constitute separate products; (3) Microsoft does not give consumers the opportunity to buy Windows without Windows Media Player; and (4) tying the two products restricted competition on the media players market. Finally, the Court rejected Microsoft's claim that the tying in question produced efficiency gains capable of offsetting its anticompetitive effects.
The Existence of Two Separate Products
In 1995, RealNetworks became the first large company to market products allowing the streaming of digital audio content, including RealAudioPlayer. In February 1997 RealNetworks released RealPlayer 4.0, which played live and on-demand audio and video. Apple developed a media player called "QuickTime Player" in the early 1990s. It initially ran only on Macintosh computers. In November 1994 Apple released QuickTime 2.0 for Windows and, in April 1999, QuickTime 4.0, which supported media streaming. In August 1999, Microsoft released the Windows Media Technologies 4 architecture, which included Windows Media Player, Windows Media Services, Windows Media Tools, and Microsoft's own digital rights management technology. That software no longer provided native support for RealNetworks' or QuickTime's formats.
The Commission disputed Microsoft's argument that the integration of media functionality in Windows client PC operating systems formed part of a natural evolution. Microsoft was unable to develop a streaming media player using its own technology. It was only after it acquired VXtreme in 1997 that Microsoft was able to create a media player capable of competing with RealNetworks' player. The Commission also cited an email sent to Mr. Gates in January 1997 by Mr. Bay, a Microsoft executive, in which Mr. Bay proposed to "reposition [the] streaming media battle from NetShow vs. Real to Windows vs. Real" and to "follow the [Internet Explorer] strategy wherever appropriate." The Court concluded that the Commission was correct to find that client PC operating systems and streaming media players constituted separate products.
The Court noted that the IT and communications industry is an industry in constant and rapid evolution. What initially appear to be separate products may subsequently be regarded as forming a single product, both from the technological aspect and from the aspect of the competition rules. The Court then explained that the distinctiveness of products has to be assessed by reference to customer demand. In the absence of independent demand for the allegedly tied product, there can be no question of separate products and no abusive tying.
The Court rejected Microsoft's argument that the Commission had applied the wrong test and that it ought in reality to have ascertained whether what was alleged to be the tying product was regularly offered without the tied product or whether customers wanted Windows without media functionality. In fact, the Court explained, complementary products can constitute separate products for the purposes of Article 82 EC. For example, even though there is no demand for a nail gun magazine without nails, that did not prevent the Community Courts from concluding that those two products belonged to separate markets.
In the case of complementary products, such as client PC operating systems and application software, it is possible that customers will wish to obtain the products together, but from different sources. If OEMs and consumers were able to obtain Windows without Windows Media Player, that would not mean that they would choose to obtain Windows without a streaming media player. OEMs would still offer a software package including a streaming media player that works with Windows, but that player would not necessarily be Windows Media Player.
Other factors supporting the finding that there is separate consumer demand for streaming media players included the following.
First, there are distributors who develop and supply streaming media players on an autonomous basis, independently of client PC operating systems. Apple supplies its QuickTime player separately from its client PC operating systems, and RealNetworks, Microsoft's main competitor on the streaming media players market, neither develops nor sells client PC operating systems. Sale of the tied product constitutes serious evidence of the existence of a separate market for that product.
Second, Windows Media Player can be downloaded, independently of the Windows client PC operating system, from Microsoft's Internet site. Likewise, Microsoft releases upgrades of Windows Media Player, independently of releases or upgrades of its Windows client PC operating system.
As regards Microsoft's argument that the integration of Windows Media Player in the Windows operating system from May 1999 constituted a normal and necessary step in the evolution of that system and was in keeping with the constant improvement of its media functionality, the Court observed that the fact that tying takes the form of the technical integration of one product in another does not preclude a finding that two separate products have been illegally bundled. Even when the tying of two products is consistent with commercial usage or when there is a natural link between the two products in question, it may nonetheless constitute abuse unless it is objectively justified.
Coercion
Microsoft contended that the fact that it integrated Windows Media Player in the Windows client PC operating system did not entail any coercion or supplementary obligation within the meaning of Article 82(d) EC. First, customers pay nothing extra for the media functionality of Windows. Second, customers are not obliged to use that functionality. Third, customers are not prevented from installing and using competitors' media players. The Court rejected Microsoft's arguments. It noted that consumers were unable to acquire the Windows client PC operating system without simultaneously acquiring Windows Media Player. Thus, the condition that the conclusion of contracts was made subject to acceptance of supplementary obligations was satisfied.
In most cases that coercion was applied primarily to OEMs, and was then passed on to consumers. Under Microsoft's licensing system, an OEM could not obtain a license on the Windows operating system without Windows Media Player. Because it was not technically possible to uninstall Windows Media Player, there was also technical coercion.
The Court ruled that it was no defense that customers were not required to pay anything extra for Windows Media Player. First, while it was true that Microsoft did not charge a separate price for Windows Media Player, it could not be inferred that the media player was provided free of charge. The price of Windows Media Player was included in the total price of the Windows client PC operating system. Second, a contract may be deemed subject to supplementary obligations even if consumers do not have to pay a certain price for the tied product.
Nor was it relevant that consumers were not obliged to use the Windows Media Player pre-installed on their client PC or that they could install and use other firms' media players on their PCs. Neither Article 82(d) nor the case law on bundling required that consumers be forced to use the tied product or prevented from using the same product supplied by a competitor. Accordingly, the Commission was correct to find that the condition relating to the imposition of supplementary obligations was satisfied in the present case.
Foreclosure of Competition
The Court explained that Article 82 is intended to prohibit a dominant firm from strengthening its position by recourse to means other than competition on the merits. It rejected Microsoft's contention that the Commission had failed to prove that the integration of Windows Media Player in the Windows client PC operating system foreclosed competition.
First, it was "clear that owing to the bundling, Windows Media Player enjoyed an unparalleled presence on client PCs throughout the world, because it thereby automatically achieved a level of market penetration corresponding to that of the Windows client PC operating system and did so without having to compete on the merits with competing products." Second, users who found Windows Media Player pre-installed on their client PCs were in general less likely to use alternative media players as they already had an application which delivered media streaming and playback functionality. Third, the bundling created disincentives for OEMs to ship third-party media players on their client PCs. OEMs are reluctant to add a second media player, which would use hard-disk capacity on the client PC while offering functionality similar, to that of Windows Media Player. Moreover, it was unlikely that consumers would be prepared to pay a higher price for such a bundle. OEMs generally operate on thin profit margins and would therefore prefer to avoid having to bear such costs themselves. In addition, the presence of several media players on the same client PC created a risk of confusion on the part of users and could increase customer support and testing costs.
Furthermore, even if developers of media players competing with Microsoft succeeded in reaching an agreement with OEMs for the pre-installation of their product, they would still be in a disadvantageous competitive position by comparison with Microsoft. First, because Windows Media Player cannot be removed from Windows by OEMs or users, the third-party media player could never be the only media player on the client PC. Because the number of media players that OEMs are prepared to pre-install on client PCs is limited, developers of third-party media players compete with each other in order to have their products pre-installed. By bundling, Microsoft evades that competition and the significant additional costs which it entails.
Methods of distributing media players other than pre-installation by OEMs could not offset Windows Media Player's ubiquity. While it is true that downloading via the Internet enables suppliers to reach a large number of users, it does not guarantee competing media players distribution equivalent to Windows Media Player's. Moreover, downloading, unlike using a pre-installed product, is seen as complicated by a significant number of users. A significant number of download attempts -more than 50%, according to tests carried out by RealNetworks in 2003 -are not successfully concluded. In addition, users will probably tend to consider that a media player integrated in their client PC will work better than a product they install themselves. Finally, most employers prohibit employees from downloading software from the Internet as that complicates the work of the network administrators.
The Court noted that the market for streaming media players is characterized by significant indirect network effects or, to use the expression employed by Mr. Gates, on the existence of a "positive feedback loop." That expression describes the phenomenon where, the greater the number of users of a given software platform, the more there will be invested in developing products compatible with that platform. This, in turn, reinforces the popularity of that platform with users. The Commission was therefore correct to observe that software developers and content providers were inclined to create applications for a single platform if that enabled them to reach virtually all potential users of their products, whereas porting, marketing and supporting other platforms gave rise to additional costs. This gave Microsoft a competitive advantage unrelated to the merits of its product and made entry by new contenders very difficult.
The Court thus concluded that the Commission was correct to make the following findings:
• Microsoft uses Windows as a distribution channel to ensure for itself a significant competitive advantage on the media players market.
• Because of the bundling, Microsoft's competitors are a priori at a disadvantage even if their products are inherently better than Windows Media Player.
• Microsoft interferes with the normal competitive process which would benefit users by ensuring quicker cycles of innovation as a consequence of unfettered competition on the merits.
• The bundling increases the content and applications barriers to entry, which protect Windows, and facilitates the erection of such barriers for Windows Media Player.
• Microsoft shields itself from effective competition from vendors of potentially more efficient media players who could challenge its position, and thus reduces the talent and capital invested in innovation of media players.
• By means of the bundling, Microsoft may expand its position in adjacent media-related software markets and weaken effective competition, to the detriment of consumers.
• By means of the bundling, Microsoft sends signals which deter innovation in any technologies in which it might conceivably take an interest and which it might tie with Windows in the future.
The Commission therefore had grounds to conclude that there was a reasonable likelihood that tying Windows and Windows Media Player would lead to a lessening of competition so that the maintenance of an effective competition structure would not be ensured in the foreseeable future. The Commission did not state, or have to prove, that the tying would lead to the elimination of all competition on the market for streaming media players.
The Absence of Objective Justification
Although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances that constitute an infringement of Article 82 EC was on the Commission, the burden was on Microsoft to plead objective justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. The Court concluded that Microsoft had failed to meet that burden.
Microsoft claimed that the Commission had ignored the benefits flowing from its business model, which entails the ongoing integration of new functionality into Windows. It asserted that the integration of media functionality in Windows was indispensable in order for software developers and Internet site creators to be able to continue to benefit from the significant advantages offered by the "stable and welldefined" Windows platform. Removal of media functionality from Windows would, according to Microsoft, create a series of problems to the detriment of consumers, software developers and Internet site creators. It referred, in particular, to the fact that the Windows operating system relies on the method know as componentization and that the withdrawal of media functionality would result in the degrading and fragmentation of that system.
In rejecting these arguments, the Court explained:
The circumstance to which the Commission takes exception is not that Thus, the Commission does not interfere with Microsoft's business model in so far as that model includes the integration of a streaming media player in its client PC operating system or the possibility for that operating system to allow software developers and Internet site creators to take advantage of the benefits offered by the stable and well-defined Windows platform.
Lastly, the Court concluded that Microsoft had failed to show that the integration of Windows Media Player in Windows created technical efficiencies or led to superior technical product performance.
The Amount of the Fine
Microsoft claimed that the original fine of EUR 497 million, and the additional EUR 3 million per day penalty, were excessive and disproportionate and should therefore be annulled or substantially reduced. The Commission maintained that the fine was not excessive and pointed out that it represented only 1.62% of Microsoft's worldwide turnover in the business year ending June 30, 2003.The Court upheld the fine in light of the gravity and duration of the infringement, explaining:
First, as regards the gravity of the infringement, it must be borne in mind at the outset that the two abuses at issue form part of a leveraging infringement, consisting in Microsoft's use of its dominant position on the client PC operating systems market to extend that dominant position to two adjacent markets, namely the market for work group server operating systems and the market for streaming media players.
The Court would observe that a number of internal Microsoft documents in the file confirm that Microsoft made use, by leveraging, of its dominant position on the client PC operating systems market to strengthen its position on the work group server operating systems market. Thus, the Commission cites an extract from an email from Mr. Bayer, a senior director of Microsoft, to Mr. Madigan, another senior director of Microsoft, in which he states that " [Microsoft] has a huge advantage in the enterprise computing market by leveraging the dominance of the Windows desktop."
It is clear from an extract from a speech given by Mr. Gates in February 1997 that the most senior directors of Microsoft regarded interoperability as a tool in that leveraging strategy. That extract reads as follows: "What we are trying to do is use our server control to do new protocols and lock out Sun and Oracle specifically. . . . Now, I don't know if we'll get to that or not, but that's what we are trying to do."
The Court notes that Mr. Gates' speech was given in February 1997, well before the date on which Microsoft rejected the request contained in the letter of 15 September 1998. The Commission was therefore correct to consider that Microsoft's refusal formed part of an overall strategy consisting in Microsoft's use of its dominant position on the client PC operating systems market to strengthen its dominant position on the adjacent market for work group server operating systems.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the Commission was correct to apply a weighting of 2 to that amount to ensure that the fine was sufficiently deterrent and to reflect Microsoft's significant economic capacity. Since Microsoft is very likely to maintain its dominant position on the client PC operating systems market, at least over the coming years, it cannot be precluded that it will have other opportunities to use leveraging vis-à-vis other adjacent markets.
Furthermore, Microsoft had already faced proceedings in the United States for a practice similar to the abusive tying at issue, namely the tying of its Internet Explorer browser and its Windows client PC operating system, and the possibility cannot be precluded that it might commit the same type of infringement in future with other application software.
This case has been developed from published sources for pedagogical purposes. The case is not intended to furnish primary data, serve as an endorsement of the organization in question, or illustrate either effective or ineffective management techniques or strategies. 
